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WHAT KIND OF BUSINESS-FRIENDLY COURT?
EXPLAINING THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE'S
SUCCESS AT THE ROBERTS COURT
David L. Franklin*

INTRODUCTION

The Chamber of Commerce of the United States
("Chamber") has been an exceptionally active participant in
cases at the United States Supreme Court in recent years.
Through its litigating affiliate, the National Chamber
Litigation Center ("NCLC"), the Chamber occasionally
submits briefs to the Court on its own behalf as a party, but
much more often it files on behalf of the business community
as amicus curiae, at both the certiorari and the plenary
stages of review.' More strikingly, in the less than three full
Terms of the Roberts Court, the Chamber has been not only
unusually active but unusually successful at both stages.
Petitions for certiorari supported by amicus briefs from the
Chamber are granted at an unusually high rate, and parties
supported by the Chamber at the merits stage prevail more
than two-thirds of the time. This article seeks to explain why
the Chamber has been so successful at the merits stage.
The numbers are remarkable: since the current Roberts
Court was formed in January 2006 with the elevation of
Justice Samuel Alito, the Court has decided forty-three cases
in which the Chamber filed a brief either as a party or
amicus. 2 In these forty-three cases, the party supported by
*Associate Professor, DePaul University College of Law. I thank Marie Wade
for superb research assistance.
1. The Chamber has been a party in one granted case before the Roberts
Court thus far. See Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Brown, 128
S. Ct. 2408 (2008).
2. The data set includes five cases decided after Justice Alito joined the
Court but in which he did not participate. It excludes cases in which the writ of
certiorari was dismissed. It also excludes Warner-Lambert Co. v. Kent, 128 S.
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the Chamber ended up prevailing in thirty, for a winning
percentage of almost seventy percent.3
This is a very
impressive win/loss ratio for any amicus other than the
United States.4 During some periods, the Chamber's win rate
has been nothing short of extraordinary. For example, in the
Court's October 2006 Term, the Chamber was on the winning
side as an amicus in thirteen cases and on the losing side in
only two, a win rate of almost eighty-seven percent.' As of
this writing, the Chamber has actually been on a bit of a
slide,' but the overall trend seems clear. Nor, it should be
added, did the parties supported by the Chamber typically
squeak by with narrow, five-to-four victories-twelve of the
Chamber's thirty wins were by unanimous votes, and in eight
more, the Chamber or the party it supported got seven or
eight votes.'
As the Chamber's success rate illustrates, there is little
doubt that the Roberts Court is, broadly speaking, a businessfriendly Court.' The questions that remain have to do with

Ct. 1168 (2008) (per curiam), in which the Court affirmed the judgment below
by an equally divided court, and Mohawk Industries,Inc. v. Williams, 547 U.S.
516 (2006) (per curiam), in which the judgment was vacated and remanded
without opinion. If these two cases are included, the Chamber's win rate
improves to 71% (32 out of 45). See infra app., tbl.1. In slightly less than half of
its amicus filings during this period, the Chamber was alone on its amicus brief,
in the remainder of cases, the Chamber filed jointly with another amicus or
other amici on the same brief.
3. See infra app., tbl.1. I define the prevailing party as the petitioner (or
appellant) in cases in which the judgment below was reversed or vacated and as
the respondent (or appellee) in cases in which the judgment below was affirmed.
4. The Roberts Court has sided with the government in almost eighty
percent of business-related cases in which the United States has participated.
See Sri Srinivasan & Bradley W. Joondeph, Business, the Roberts Court, and the
Solicitor General: Why the Supreme Court's Recent Business Decisions May Not
Reveal Very Much, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV 1103, 1114 (2009) (tbl. 2).
5. See infra app., tbl.1.
6. The party supported by the Chamber lost in seven recent cases. See
Vaden v. Discover Bank, 129 S. Ct. 1262 (2009); Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct.
1187 (2009); Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville and Davidson Cty., 129 S. Ct.
846 (2009); Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538 (2008); Bridge v, Phoenix
Bond & Indem. Co., 128 S. Ct. 2131 (2008); Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power
Lab., 128 S. Ct. 2395 (2008); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 128 S. Ct. 2343
(2008).
7. See infra app., tbl.1.
8. The media has picked up on this trend. See Michael Orey, The Supreme
Court: Open for Business, BUS. WEEK, July 9, 2007, at 30; Jeffrey Rosen,
Supreme Court Inc., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2008, §MM (Magazine) at 38; David
G. Savage, High Court is Good for Business, L.A. TIMES, June 21, 2007, at Al.
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what kind of a business-friendly Court it is. In what contexts
is the Court especially receptive to the arguments and
interests of business, and for what reasons? In what areas
has the Court remained relatively unreceptive, and why? Are
the Court's pro-business leanings best explained in terms of
legal doctrines or ideological preferences? This article does
not purport to quantify the influence of the Chamber's amicus
briefs on the Court; for reasons described in Part I, such
measurements of causal efficacy are notoriously difficult to
make with any confidence, and in any case, the small data set
would not yield statistically significant results.9 Instead, it
uses the Chamber's cases at the Court as a qualitative vehicle
for exploring the nature and possible causes of the Roberts
Court's apparent pro-business orientation. By examining the
Court's opinions along with the Chamber's briefs, we can get
a sense of which arguments resonate with the justices in
cases of interest to the business community and which
themes emerge most forcefully in their decisions.
Because the Roberts Court has been in existence for less
than three full Terms, any conclusions reached at this point
must be tentative. With that proviso firmly in place, this
article suggests that the Court's decisions in business cases
are characterized not so much by a bias in favor of business
per se, but by a skepticism about litigation as a mode of
regulation. Thus, businesses seem to fare especially well
when they are defendants; even better when the justices
appear to view the litigation in question as having broad
regulatory goals as opposed to individualized remedial
objectives; and better still when the justices view the
litigation as lawyer-driven rather than party-driven. These
are broad themes rather than rigid rules; they hold more
weight for some justices than for others and, it bears
repeating, they are asserted here provisionally rather than
finally, absent further empirical testing. For now, though, it
can be said that skepticism about litigation as a regulatory
tool is a theme that features prominently in the Court's
business cases.
Part I of this article describes the Chamber's litigation

9. For one attempt to measure the efficacy of amicus briefs in the Supreme
Court, see generally Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of
Amicus CuriaeBriefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743 (2000).
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efforts generally and its participation as amicus in the
Supreme Court in particular, and canvasses the existing
literature on amicus brief efficacy in order to put the
Chamber's efforts and outcomes in perspective. Part II is the
main part of the article; it examines the Court's decisions and
the Chamber's briefs in five key areas-preemption, punitive
damages, arbitration, pleading standards, and employment
discrimination-and finds in these areas a consistent theme
of skepticism about litigation as a mode of regulatory control.
The article concludes with a brief comment about the
implications of this preliminary finding for future research.
I.
THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
AS AMICUS CURIAE IN THE SUPREME COURT

The Chamber of Commerce of the United States is the
world's largest business federation, with a membership that
includes more than three million companies, both large and
small.'
The role of the Chamber-and, indeed, of the
organized business community in general-at the Supreme
Court can be traced to a memorandum written in 1971.11 The
memo's addressee was Eugene Sydnor, who was then the
Chairman of the Chamber's Education Committee, and it
carried a rather alarmist subject line: "ATTACK OF
AMERICAN FREE ENTERPRISE SYSTEM."1 2
Today,
however, the memo is remembered most for the identity of its
author: Lewis F. Powell, Jr., a prominent Richmond lawyer
who would be appointed to the Court by President Nixon two
months later.
As the subject header suggests, Powell
concluded that "the American economic system [was]
under.., attack," 3 not only from fringe elements such as
"Communists, New Leftists, and other revolutionaries," 4 but
also from "perfectly respectable elements of society [such as]
the college campus, the pulpit, the media, the intellectual and

10. U.S. Chamber of Commerce, About Us, http://www.uschamber.com/
about/default.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2009).
11. See Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell to Eugene Sydnor, Jr.,
Chairman, Education Comm., U.S. Chamber of Commerce (Aug. 23, 1971)
availableat http://reclaimdemocracy.orgtcorporate-accountability/powellmemo
_lewis.html.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
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literary journals, the arts and sciences, and.., politicians."15
He recommended a wide range of responses, including an
increased role for the Chamber in the courts:
[Tihe Chamber would need a highly competent staff of
lawyers. In special situations it should be authorized to
engage, to appear as counsel amicus in the Supreme
Court, lawyers of national standing and reputation. The
greatest care should be exercised in selecting the cases in
which to participate or the suits to institute.
But the
16
opportunity merits the necessary effort.
In 1977, responding to Powell's call, the Chamber created
the NCLC, its affiliated public policy law firm. 17 The NCLC's
six legal advisory committees, whose members include
prominent corporate attorneys, help the NCLC craft its
litigation strategy, in particular by helping decide which
cases to participate in as amicus. 8 The NCLC organizes moot
courts and strategy sessions to support counsel for businesses
that have cases before the Court.1 9 Most pertinent to this
article, it files briefs on behalf of the Chamber both as
plaintiff and amicus in a wide range of cases of interest to the
business community in areas as diverse as preemption,
punitive damages, arbitration, the dormant Commerce
Clause, campaign finance reform, environmental law,
securities law, and employment discrimination. As Powell
urged, the Chamber regularly enlists prominent members of
the appellate bar to appear as counsel of record on its amicus
briefs.2"
As a matter of policy, the Chamber does not
participate in cases that pit one member business against
another, which means that it sits out many of the patent and
antitrust cases before the Court. Taken as a whole, though,
NCLC's efforts in the Supreme Court and in lower courts
substantiate Richard Lazarus's recent observation that over
the past decade the private Supreme Court bar has
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See U.S. Chamber of Commerce, National Chamber Litigation Center,
http://wvv.uschamber.com/nclc/default (last visited Jan. 31, 2009).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Disclosure: the author's brother, Jonathan S. Franklin, appeared as
counsel of record on the Chamber's amicus brief in Allison Engine Co. v. United
States ex rel. Sanders, 128 S. Ct. 2123 (2008), and serves on the NCLC's
Constitutional and Administrative Law Advisory Committee.
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"persuade [d] the Court to enter into areas of law of interest to
the regulated community to correct what business perceives
as problematic legal doctrine."2 '
As noted in the Introduction, the raw numbers on the
Chamber's results are striking. The Chamber's success rate
in the Roberts Court has been 69.8% (30 wins in 43 cases).22
If affirmances by an equally divided Court and cases resolved
by vacatur and remand without opinion are added, the
percentage rises to 71.1% (32 wins in 45 cases).
By
comparison, during the eleven years of the last Rehnquist
"natural Court" (1994-2005), the Chamber's success rate as
amicus was a somewhat less impressive 62% (47 wins in 76
cases).23 The Chamber's total filings have also increased:
during the Roberts Court, the Chamber has filed in an
average of more than twelve cases per Term, compared to a
rate of slightly less than seven cases per Term during the
eleven years of the last Rehnquist natural Court.
In the 43 cases that form the primary Roberts Court data
set for this article, the party supported by the Chamber
received a total of 234 votes, compared to 142 votes for the
opposing party.24 The justice who sided with the Chamber
most often was Scalia (33 times in 43 cases, or 77% of the
time), with Chief Justice Roberts a close second (32 times in
43 cases, or 74%). The justices who sided with the Chamber
least often were Ginsburg (18 times in 43 cases, or 42%) and
Stevens (19 times in 43 cases, or 44%). In all of these cases,
the Chamber sided with a business defendant (or declaratory
judgment plaintiff), usually one that had been sued by an
individual plaintiff. Thus, the important pattern to be
explained in the Court's decisions is the relative success of
business defendants, not business parties in general.2"
It is worth noting that the Chamber has been, if
21. Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the Supreme
Court: Transforming the Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 GEO. L.J. 1487,
1532 (2008).
22. See infra app., tbl.1.
23. See infra app., tbl.1. The author made these calculations after searching
the Westlaw "All U.S. Supreme Court Cases (SCT)" database for cases in which
the Chamber was involved. Westlaw, http://www.westlaw.com (last visited Mar.
27, 2009).
24. See infra app., tbl.1.
25. This pattern of business defendant success bears itself out as well in the
business-vs.-business cases in which the Chamber does not participate.
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anything, even more successful at the certiorari stage of
review in the Court than at the plenary stage. A recent study
showed that the Chamber has filed more amicus briefs at the
certiorari
stage in recent years than any other
nongovernmental entity.2 6 The Chamber filed fifty-five such
briefs during between May 2004 and August 2007; the
second-place finisher, the National Association of Criminal
Defense Attorneys, filed thirty-three."
When the Chamber
filed as an amicus in support of a petition for certiorari, the
study found, the petition was granted twenty-six percent of
the time-a rate far higher than that for all petitions (less
than one percent) or for all paid petitions (less than five
percent).2 8 The Chamber's high levels of activity and success
at the certiorari stage reflect its strategically sophisticated
effort to shape the Court's shrinking docket.
There is another pattern that must be mentioned here as
well. As Sri Srinavasan and Bradley Joondeph describe in
their article for this symposium, the statistics support the
conclusion that the Roberts Court's pro-business orientation
is trumped by an even stronger pro-federal government
orientation.29 Out of the fifteen cases in the data set in which
the Chamber and the United States were on the same side as
amicus, the party they supported won fourteen.3 ° Just as
strikingly, the party supported by the Chamber lost eleven of
the thirteen cases in which the Chamber and the United
States were on opposite sides as amici.3 1 And, as important
as the Chamber may have been in helping to win grants of
certiorari as an amicus, the Office of the Solicitor General's
recommendations at the certiorari stage continue to carry
even more weight.
Experienced members of the Supreme Court bar view the
Chamber's participation at the Court as not only successful
26. Adam Chandler, Cert.-stage Amicus Briefs: Who Files Them and to What
Effect?, SCOTUS BLOG, Sept. 27, 2007, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/certstage-amicus-briefs-who-files-them-and-to-what-effect-2/.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Srinivasan & Joondeph, supra note 4, at 1118.
30. The sole loss came in Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009).
31. The two victories came in Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel.
Sanders, 128 S. Ct. 2123 (2008), a False Claims Act case in which the Office of
the Solicitor General filed a brief as amicus in support of qui tam relators who
had initiated an action in the name of the United States, and 14 Penn Plaza
LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009).
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but influential. Carter Phillips of Sidley Austin, for instance,
one of the most prominent and successful members of the
Supreme Court bar, submitted these words of praise on the
occasion of the NCLC's thirtieth anniversary:
The briefs filed by the Chamber in that Court and in the
lower courts are uniformly excellent. They explain
precisely why the issue is important to business interests.
. . . Except for the Solicitor General representing the
United States, no single entity has more influence on what
cases the Supreme Court decides and how it decides
them
32
than the National Chamber Litigation Center.
Phillips's conclusion about the Chamber's influence is a
subjective one, albeit based on an exceptionally broad
reservoir of personal experience. Objectively, any attempt to
measure the efficacy of amicus briefs on Supreme Court
decision-making is bound to be less definitive. While past
studies have found that amicus participation is correlated
with increased success at both the certiorari and merits
stages, they caution that correlation is not the same as
causation. 3 It is very difficult to determine, for instance,
whether the greater number of amici supporting a particular
party helped that party to prevail, or whether more amici
simply judged that party likely to succeed and therefore
jumped on what they correctly predicted would be a winning
bandwagon. 3
To be sure, some organizations file amicus
briefs without much caring whether their side will win: as
Justice Scalia and his co-author Bryan Garner have written,
32.

NAT'L CHAMBER LITIG. CTR., 30TH ANNIVERSARY REPORT 1997-2007 8

(2007), availableat http://www.uschamber.com/NR/rdonlyres/euefda5z2fmlalmf
h3fvql2gvas7wwz4ez3xedc74ytjspl4aj6fokrsgag76xmy6gnbcnhisv5jvrx2rmqimjy
62db/nclc3thanniversaryreportfinal.pdf.
33. See, e.g., Paul M. Collins, Jr., Lobbyists Before the U.S. Supreme Court:
Investigating the Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs, 60 POL. RES. Q. 55, 56
(2007) ("[Illustrating a simple correlation between interest group involvement
and the Court's decisions does not provide support for a causal relationship
between the two.").
34. See, e.g., Kearney & Merrill, supra note 9, at 770-71 (noting that
institutional litigants "might seek to build up their credibility with the Court by
filing frequently on the side they would predict to be more likely to win"). One
study that used regression analysis in an attempt to eliminate this problem
concluded in general that "while amicus briefs do increase litigation success,
even when controlling for other more established influences, this influence is
only marginal." Paul M. Collins, Jr., Friends of the Court: Examining the
Influence of Amicus Curiae Participationin U.S. Supreme Court Litigation, 38
LAW & SOC'Y REV. 807, 827 (2004).
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"[perhaps the most common purpose [of amicus briefs], at
least in courts of last resort, is to enable the officers of trade
associations to show their members that they are on the
ball."35 But sophisticated repeat players like the Chamber no
doubt have an interest in presenting themselves to their
constituents and to the Court as winners that exceeds their
interest in merely presenting themselves as active
participants. 6
Another variable that would need to be
controlled in any quantitative study is the tendency of "topside" parties (petitioners or appellants) to enjoy a higher
success rate in the Supreme Court than "bottom-side" parties
(respondents or appellees). This tendency is borne out in the
present data set: out of the twenty-nine cases in which the
Chamber was or supported the top-side party, that party won
twenty-two (76%). Bottom-side parties supported by the
Chamber prevailed in eight cases out of fourteen (57%).37 In
sum, any data set based on cases in which an organization
chose to file as amicus presents a significant problem of
selection bias.
Moreover, even if there were some way to measure the
causal influence of amicus briefs, it would be difficult to
determine whether the causal factor was the content of the
briefs. Indeed, according to the pure interest group model of
amicus brief efficacy, "It]he fact that the organization saw fit
to file the brief is the important datum, not the legal
arguments or the background information set forth between

35.

ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, MAKING YOUR CASE: THE ART OF

PERSUADING JUDGES 103 (2008).

On the other hand, repeat players like the

Chamber surely recognize that duplicative, "me too" briefs-even if filed on the
side likely to prevail-are perceived as an irritant by justices and their law
clerks, and they accordingly resist filing unless there is really something new to
say. See id. at 105-06; Kelly J. Lynch, Best Friends?Supreme Court Law Clerks
on Effective Amicus CuriaeBriefs, 20 J.L. & POL. 33, 69-70 (2004).
36. See Collins, supra note 33, at 64 ("[Ilt is reasonable to expect that
organized interests might file amicus briefs in cases they are predisposed
toward 'winning,' to appear influential to their members and patrons (but
without actually influencing the Court's decision making)."); Kearney & Merrill,
supra note 9, at 771. Some law firms may perceive a gain in prestige merely
from filing as amicus, on either side of the case. See id. at 826-27.
37. Interestingly, one study found that amicus briefs in support of
respondents were in general somewhat more effective than those in support of
petitioners, perhaps because petitioners already have to be represented by able
counsel in order to convince the Court to grant review, so respondents may
benefit more from a boost by experienced counsel filing as amicus. See Kearney
& Merrill, supra note 9, at 816-17.
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the covers of the brief."" Nor are citation counts a reliable
measurement of the efficacy of amicus briefs: briefs are often
cited simply to describe, or even rebut, an argument, and at
any rate a citation tells us little about whether the justices
would have arrived at the same idea independently.39
For all of these reasons-and because the Roberts Court
simply has not decided enough cases yet to create a robust
statistical sample-this article will not attempt any
quantitative assessment of the Chamber's influence on the
Court. Rather, it will examine the Court's decisions in cases
in which the Chamber has participated, along with the
Chamber's briefs, to identify a theme that runs through those
decisions: skepticism about litigation as a vehicle for
regulation.
II. THE ROBERTS COURT'S DECISIONS
IN CASES IN WHICH THE CHAMBER PARTICIPATED

The theme of skepticism toward litigation as a regulatory
tool emerges clearly in five key categories of cases in which
the Chamber has participated: preemption, punitive
damages, arbitration, pleading standards, and employment
discrimination. In the first four of these categories, the
Chamber has fared quite well at the Roberts Court. In the
final category-employment
discrimination cases-the
Chamber has been much less successful thus far, but its
failures in this area may yield as much insight into the
justices' attitudes toward business cases as do its successes in
the others.
A. Preemption
The Chamber has generally been quite successful in
cases in which it has supported corporate defendants who
38. Id. at 786.
39. For studies counting citations, see id. at 757-61; Karen O'Connor & Lee
Epstein, Court Rules and Workload: A Case Study of Rules Governing Amicus
Participation,8 JUST. SYS. J. 35, 42-43 (1983). Citations can plausibly be taken
as an indication of the amicus's prestige, or the Court's interest in signaling the
seriousness with which it takes the amicus (or even counsel for amicus). This is
a good explanation for the unusual attention paid by the Court, both at oral
argument and in its decision, to the amicus briefs filed by corporate and retired
military leaders in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). Interestingly, no
member of the Court has cited an amicus brief filed by the Chamber since the
Roberts Court began in January 2006.
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assert that federal statutes or regulations either expressly or
implicitly preclude enforcement of state regulatory or
common law (often tort law). As federal statutes and agency
rules have become increasingly deregulatory, the Chamber
has mounted an extensive nationwide campaign to persuade
courts around the country, and the Supreme Court in
particular, to take a more aggressive pro-preemption stance.4 °
These efforts have already borne fruit in the Roberts Court: a
plausible count of preemption cases yields five victories for
the Chamber before the Roberts Court and three losses.4 '
It is always hazardous to attempt to discern patterns in
the Court's preemption jurisprudence, because every
statutory scheme is distinctive and because the Court's task
is to determine legislative intent rather than to inscribe its
own legal or political preferences on a blank slate.
Nonetheless, an examination of the Roberts Court's
preemption decisions yields a consistent theme: distrust of
litigation as a regulatory mechanism. 42
The Chamber's
amicus briefs, for their part, have hammered this theme
home in two very different ways, sometimes with an
emphasis on real-world consequences and sometimes through
ambitious doctrinal argumentation.
A good example is Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc. v. Dabit,4 3 in which the Court held that the Securities
44
Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 ("SLUSA")
preempted state-law securities fraud class actions brought by
holders of securities.
Justice Stevens quite candidly

40. See U.S. Chamber of Commerce, supra note 17.
41. The victories were Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Brown,
128 S. Ct. 2408 (2008); Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008); Rowe v.
New Hampshire Motor TransportationAss'n, 128 S. Ct. 989 (2008); Watters v.
Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1 (2007); and Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71 (2006). The losses were Altria Group, Inc. v.
Good, 129 S. Ct. 538 (2008); Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633
(2006); and Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009). This count does not include
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008), in which the Court did not
reach the Clean Water Act preemption issue urged by the Chamber.
42. Another theme, consistent with the Court's pro-federal government
orientation but beyond the scope of this article, is deference to federal agencies
with respect to their determinations concerning preemption.
See, e.g.,
Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies and the
Federalizationof Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 227 (2007).
43. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71 (2006).
44. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(1)(A) (2006).
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grounded his opinion for a unanimous eight-justice Court 45 in
policy considerations, most importantly that "litigation under
Rule 10b-5 presents a danger of vexatiousness different in
degree and in kind from that which accompanies litigation in
general."46 These considerations had led the Court, more
than thirty years ago, to limit the private right of action
under Rule 10b-5 to plaintiffs who were themselves injured in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities. 47 With the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA"),
the Court explained, Congress enacted this policy concern
into law, aiming to reduce rampant "nuisance filings,
targeting of deep-pocket defendants, vexatious discovery
requests, and manipulation by class action lawyers of the
clients whom they purportedly represent."48 In response to
the PSLRA, "some members of the plaintiffs' bar" began to
file class actions under state law, often in state court. 49 To
head off this end-around, Congress enacted SLUSA.
In the Dabit litigation, the Second Circuit had held that
SLUSA preempted only those actions in which a private right
of action under Rule 10b-5 would lie, i.e., in which the
plaintiff was a purchaser or seller.5 0 But the Supreme Court
held that the narrower interpretation was relevant only to
the question of private rights of action; the rule's substantive
scope, and therefore its preemptive effect, had always been
broader. Adopting the narrower reading for preemption
purposes would frustrate Congress's purposes by failing to
preempt class actions brought by holders of securities, which
"pose a special risk of vexatious litigation,"5 1 and by allowing
duplicative class actions to unfold simultaneously in state
and federal courts. 52 "Finally," the Court added, "federal law,
not state law, has long been the principal vehicle for asserting
class-action securities fraud claims." 3
The Chamber's brief in Dabit nicely anticipated Justice
45. Justice Alito did not participate.
46. Dabit, 547 U.S. at 80 (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
421 U.S. 723, 739 (1975)).
47. Id. at 80-81 (citing Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 751).
48. Id. at 81 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.)).
49. Id. at 82.
50. Id. at 84.
51. Id. at 86 (quoting Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 739).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 88.
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Stevens's eventual opinion in the case by emphasizing the
practical consequences of permitting state-law shareholder
actions to proceed. Indeed, after lingering only briefly over a
plain-language argument for preemption (which the Court did
not pick up on at all),54 the Chamber devoted the bulk of its
brief to depicting securities fraud class actions in general as
an economic horror show. Hence the following heading in the
brief: "The Pressure To Settle Even Meritless Securities Class
Actions Imposes An Enormous Toll On The National
Economy."" Citing a dozen books and articles from the law
and economics literature, the brief argued that "the costs and
risks of litigation [make] the merits of securities suits largely
irrelevant to the decision to settle."5 6 Instead, the best
predictors of whether plaintiffs will file suit are the severity
of the decline in the stock price and the size of the defendant's
insurance policy.57 Such suits cause ripple effects throughout
the economy, as the plaintiffs' bar targets the most innovative
(and thus the most volatile) firms, and competent auditors
and directors flee the marketplace." Fear of fraud liability
chills disclosure, and mandatory disclosure leads issuers to
"bury the shareholders in an avalanche of trivial
information."5 9
U.S. markets lose ground to global
competitors as capital migrates elsewhere. And "holder"
cases, the Chamber argued, are the most likely of all to be
speculative.
Indeed, "[a]s a logical matter, holders of
securities, viewed as a class, cannot be injured,"60 because the
very fraud that caused the holder not to sell also caused the
price inflation that would have made selling a profitable
option. In the end, if holder class actions are allowed to go
forward, "the only winners in this system of blackmail suits
and windfall settlements will be the lawyers."6' 1
The Court's skepticism about tort litigation as a vehicle
54. Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 3-6, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71 (2006) (No. 04-1371).
55. Id. at 7.
56. Id. at 8 (citing Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter?A Study
of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 516-17 (1991)).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 11.
59. Id. at 12 (quoting TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 448-49
(1976)).
60. Id. at 24.
61. Id. at 26.
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of safety regulation comes across forcefully in Riegel v.
Medtronic, Inc.6 2 In Riegel, the Court construed the Medical
Device Amendments of 1976 ("MDA")63 to mean that
premarket approval of a medical device by the Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA") preempts state common-law causes of
action
alleging
defective
design,
labeling,
and
manufacturing.64
Writing for an eight-justice majority,
Justice Scalia asserted that enforcement of state tort law
would disrupt the FDA's objectives by rendering medical
devices "safer, but hence less effective." 6 He reasoned that,
as a regulatory mechanism, tort law was inferior to state
statutes or state agency rules because the latter
could at least be expected to apply cost-benefit analysis
similar to that applied by the experts at the FDA: How
many more lives will be saved by a device which, along
with its greater effectiveness, brings a greater risk of
harm? A jury, on the other hand, sees only the cost of a
more dangerous design, and is not concerned with its
benefits; the patients who reaped those benefits are not
represented in court.6 6
Although Justice Scalia, as usual, professed apathy on
the subject of legislative intent, he was willing to infer from
the text of the MDA that "solicitude for those injured by FDAapproved devices ... was overcome in Congress's estimation
by solicitude for those who would suffer without new medical
devices if juries were allowed to apply the tort law of 50
States to all innovations.'67
Somewhat surprisingly for such a significant case, the
Chamber's brief in Riegel is pitched rather narrowly, devoting
itself primarily to arguing that federal preemption was
required by the reasoning of a majority of justices in the
earlier case of Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr6 5 This may have been
a calculated bid for the vote of Justice Breyer, whose separate

62. See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S.Ct. 999 (2008).
63. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2006).
64. Riegel, 128 S.Ct. at 1006.
65. Id. at 1008.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1009.
68. See Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America
as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 9-23, Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.,
128 S.Ct. 999 (2008) (No. 06-179) (relying on the opinions in Medtronic, Inc. v.
Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996)).
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opinion in Lohr comes in for a lot of attention in the brief.69 If
so, the tactic succeeded: Justice Breyer ended up siding with
the majority opinion in Riegel, which in turn relied heavily on
the reasoning of a majority ofjustices in Lohr.7 °
By contrast to its brief in Riegel, several of the Chamber's
amicus briefs in the preemption area-particularly those on
which the counsel of record is Alan Untereiner of the
Washington law firm of Robbins, Russell, Englert, Orseck &
Untereiner-take an ambitious doctrinal approach that aims
to provide the Court with the intellectual foundation for a
newly muscular preemption jurisprudence. An example is
the brief in Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A.,
which
concerned the preemptive effect of the National Banking Act
with respect to state inspection
and registration
requirements. The issue in Watters was even narrower than
this description suggests: The state banking regulator in
Watters conceded that its regulations were preempted as
applied to the banks themselves; the only question was
whether that preemption extended to the banks' "operating
subsidiaries" such as mortgage lending operations; and all of
the courts of appeals as well as the relevant federal agency,
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, agreed that it
did.
The Court, in a five-to-three decision by Justice
Ginsburg, agreed as well.72
Despite-or perhaps because of-the narrowness of the
issue and the likelihood of the bank's success in the case, the
Chamber's brief in Watters took the opportunity to engage in
a kind of bird's-eye reconnaissance of the entire doctrine of
preemption.
In particular, the Chamber argued that
preemption is a run-of-the-mill by-product of the Supremacy
Clause;7 3 that it is particularly unremarkable in an "area of
69. See id. at 5, 6, 10, 17 (citing Lohr, 518 U.S. at 503-08 (Breyer, J.,
concurring)).
70. See Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1003-11.
71. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1 (2007).
72. Id. at 10-17. The three dissenters were an unusual lineup: Justices
Stevens and Scalia along with Chief Justice Roberts. See id. at 18-41 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). Justice Thomas did not participate.
73. Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 6-10, Watters v. Wachovia Bank,
N.A., 550 U.S. 1 (2007) (No. 05-1342) [hereinafter Watters Briefl. The brief
advances the interesting argument, made by Stephen Gardbaum, that
Congress's power to regulate preemptively does not flow from the Supremacy
Clause itself but from its enumerated Article I powers. See id. at 9; see also
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traditional federal concern" like banking; 4 and, most
provocatively, that the so-called presumption against
preemption should be repudiated.75 In support of this last
argument, the Chamber pointed to criticisms of the
presumption in opinions by Justices Scalia and Thomas,76 in
law review articles by conservative legal scholars,77 and in the
Chamber's own prior amicus briefs.7 8 The Chamber made its
own policy arguments in favor of preemption quite clear:
preemption lowers the cost of doing business nationwide,
ensures that rules will be made by federal experts rather
than parochial state regulators, and "is the sine qua non of
any effective policy of deregulation carried out by the political
branches of government at the national level."79 Besides, the
Chamber argued, Congress often takes into account the
prerogatives of state and local governments in crafting
federal regulatory schemes, so there is no need for the Court
to put a thumb on the scales against preemption. 0
More recently, the Chamber's pro-preemption crusade
experienced a setback in Altria Group, Inc. v. Good,8' but that
case's lasting significance is uncertain. At issue was whether
the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act
preempted state-law claims under a Maine anti-fraud statute.
The plaintiffs alleged that a tobacco company misled them
into believing that "light" cigarettes delivered less tar and
nicotine than ordinary cigarettes. 2 Sixteen years earlier, in
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,83 the Court splintered badly
Stephen Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767 (1994).
The brief also asserts, however, that " 'implied' preemption . . . flow[s] directly
from the Supremacy Clause" while " 'express' preemption . . . occurs when

Congress elects to regulate preemptively pursuant to its enumerated powers."
Watters Brief, supra, at 4. This seems needlessly confusing: while Gardbaum
may be right that the source of Congress's power to enact express preemption
provisions is not obvious, surely both forms of preemption occur only "when
Congress elects to regulate preemptively pursuant to its enumerated powers."
Id.
74. Watters Brief, supra note 73, at 10.
75. Id. at 11-14.
76. Id. at 12.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 13-14.
79. Id. at 17.
80. Id. at 17-21.
81. Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S.Ct. 538 (2008).
81. Id. at 541.
83. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
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over this issue and several others concerning the interaction
between the federal labeling statute and state-law tobacco
litigation. Writing for a four-justice plurality in Cipollone,
Justice Stevens concluded that fraud claims were not
preempted because they rested on a general duty not to
deceive, while claims more closely tied to smoking and
health-"failure to warn" and "warning neutralization"
claims-were preempted.'
In Altria, Justice Stevens
managed to convert his earlier plurality into a narrow, fivejustice majority. Justice Thomas filed a strongly worded
dissent, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia
and Alito, accusing the majority of rejecting the clear rule
proposed by Justice Scalia in Cipollone-that state-law
claims ought to be preempted whenever they would as a
practical matter impose requirements on the defendant
because of the effect of smoking upon health-in favor of a
confusing test that invites continued litigation. 5
Altria may not prove to be a particularly significant case
in its own right-it was largely a replay of Cipollone and
dealt with the interpretation of a fairly narrow and poorly
drafted preemption clause in a particular statute. What is
most striking about the case is that the majority embraced
the presumption against preemption, 6 while the dissent
contended that "[i]n light of Riegel, there is no authority for
invoking the presumption against pre-emption in express preemption cases. "s8 But Altria Group does not present powerful
evidence against this article's hypothesis that the Roberts
Court is suspicious of the use of litigation as a stand-in for
regulation. The plaintiffs' state-law fraud claims survived
preemption, according to the narrow five-justice majority,
precisely because they rested on a general duty not to deceive,
and not on a rule of law that purported to regulate smoking,
safety, or health. The broader trend toward the primacy of
federal statutes and rules over state tort litigation as a means
of achieving regulatory objectives remains intact after Altria
Group.
More significant, and more difficult to explain, is the

84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 530-31.
Altria Group, Inc., 129 S. Ct. at 552 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 543.
Id. at 558 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Chamber's subsequent setback in Wyeth v. Levine."8
In
Wyeth, the Court held by a six-to-three vote that the federal
drug labeling statute does not preempt state-law causes of
action alleging that drug manufacturers placed inadequate
warnings on their labels. The labeling statute (unlike the
medical device statute in Riegel) lacks an express preemption
clause, and the Court concluded that the case did not present
either form of implied preemption: "impossibility preemption"
(which exists when the defendant cannot simultaneously
comply with both state and federal law) or "obstacle
preemption" (which exists when enforcement of state law
would hinder federal objectives)., 9 Most notably, as in Altria
Group, Justice Stevens wrote for the Court and prominently
invoked the presumption against preemption. 90
The outcome in Wyeth certainly represents a rejection of
the primary arguments advanced by the Chamber's amicus
brief in the case.91 In the brief (which again lists Alan
Untereiner as counsel of record) the Chamber traced the
pedigree of implied preemption all the way back to Chief
Justice Marshall's decisions in Gibbons v. Ogden92 and
McCullough v. Maryland.93 Pursuing an originalist approach,
it cited a law review article for the proposition that the
Supremacy Clause is a "non obstante" ("notwithstanding")
provision, meaning that it calls upon judges to abandon their
usual practice of construing federal statutes narrowly to
avoid conflicts with state laws.9 4 As a result, the brief
contended, the presumption against preemption was never
meant to apply in obstacle preemption cases. This contention
attracted only three votes
in Wyeth,95 and the majority
96
it.
specifically repudiated
More broadly, the Chamber's brief in Wyeth attempted to
88. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009).
89. Id. at 1196-1203.
90. Id. at 1194-95.
91. See Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America
as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187
(2009) (No. 06-1249) [hereinafter Wyeth Brief].
92. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
93. McCullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
94. Wyeth Brief, supra note 80, at 18 (citing Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86
VA. L. REv. 225, 232, 235-44, 291-303 (2000)).
95. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1228-29 & n.14 (Alito, J., joined by Roberts, C.J.,
and Scalia, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 1195 n.3.
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make the obstacle preemption argument as attractive as
possible for key justices. Thus, the brief acknowledged that
carrying out the ongoing task of performing obstacle
preemption analysis would require judges to identify the
purposes that animate federal statutes, but contended that
this was nothing new: judges are often called upon to exercise
discretion in close cases, just as the Framers contemplated
they would be.97 By emphasizing that the Framers delegated
the task of identifying obstacle preemption to judges, the brief
tried to strike chords that would resonate both with stouthearted originalists like Justice Thomas, who are willing to
overrule precedent in order to return to founding-era
practices, and with judicial supremacists like Justice
Kennedy, who often seek to cement the Court's interpretive
primacy. This gambit failed. Justice Kennedy joined the
majority opinion, and Justice Thomas wrote an extraordinary
concurrence in which he condemned the entire doctrine of
obstacle preemption as "inherently flawed"" because it gives
binding force to policies and pronouncements that were never
actually enacted into law and "encourages an overly
expansive reading of statutory text."9 This concurrence was
not a departure for Justice Thomas: as I have written
elsewhere, he is the only conservative justice whose solicitude
for state law in constitutional federalism cases is matched by
his voting pattern in preemption cases."'
It is too early to gauge the long-term significance of
Wyeth. There are three reasons to believe, however, that it
does not signal a major change in the Roberts Court's
orientation towards business defendants. First, because the
federal statute in Wyeth contained no express preemption
provision, the case will not disturb the Court's general
tendency to read broadly those that do. Second, the plaintiff
in Wyeth-a professional musician who developed gangrene
as a result of an improperly administered anti-nausea
medication and ultimately had to have her right arm
amputated' 0 -was unusually sympathetic, and consequently

97. Id. at 24-26.
98. Id. at 1211 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 1215 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
100. See David L. Franklin, Justice Ginsburg's Common Law Federalism,at
4 n. 12 & app. B, 43 NEW ENG. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (on file with author).
101. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1191-92.
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her case may have struck most justices as a discrete request
for compensation rather than a lawyer-driven attempt at
regulation via litigation. Third, and perhaps most important,
although the government sided with the defendant in the
Wyeth litigation, the FDA for many years had taken the
position that its regulation of drug labeling could peacefully
coexist with state tort claims.'012 The agency's position
changed only in 2006, well after the jury had rendered its
verdict in the Wyeth trial, and Justice Stevens went out of his
way to characterize the change as not only dramatic but
inadequately reasoned and procedurally irregular. 1 3 Wyeth,
therefore, may tell us little about how the Court will treat
cases in which the government's support for implied
preemption has been longstanding and consistent.
B. Punitive Damages
The Chamber has been on the winning side in both of the
Roberts Court's punitive damages cases, and both reflect the
Court's skepticism about regulation by litigation. Philip
Morris USA v. Williams10 4 provides an especially telling lens
through which to view the justices' attitudes toward tort law.
In Philip Morris, the Court held that the Due Process Clause
precludes juries from basing punitive damage awards on the
harm caused by the defendant to nonparties.1 °5 Justice Breyer
wrote the majority opinion for himself, Chief Justice Roberts,
and Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Alito, while Justices
Stevens, Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg dissented.1 0 6 This
unusual lineup, especially among the dissenters, was
consistent with past cases, in which Justices Scalia and
Thomas have refused to sign onto the doctrine of substantive
due process while Justice Ginsburg has expressed her
unwillingness to tamper with state-court jury awards.' 7
Perhaps in order to keep the Chief Justice and Justice Alito
from defecting, Justice Breyer took pains in Philip Morris to
102. Id. at 1201-02.
103. Id. at 1201-03.
104. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007).
105. Id. at 349.
106. Id. at 348.
107. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 429-39
(2003) (Scalia, J., Thomas, J., and Ginsburg, J., dissenting); BMW of N. Am.,
Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 598-614 (1996) (Scalia, J., and Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
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ground his opinion in the procedural rather than the
substantive aspect of the Due Process Clause: large punitive
awards based on harm to nonparties, he reasoned, deprive
defendants of fair notice and inject a component of
arbitrariness into the trial process.'
In a confusing passage,
however, the majority stated that evidence of harm to
nonparties can still be relevant to the punitive damages
calculus to the extent it reflects the overall blameworthiness
of the defendant's conduct-so long as the jury does not use
such evidence as grounds for actually punishing the
defendant.109
The Philip Morris dissenters were right to label this
attempted distinction elusive at best.110
At trial, the
defendant had sought a jury instruction that would have tried
to articulate this difference between the two potential uses of
evidence of nonparty harms but, as Justice Ginsburg pointed
out, the proposed instruction surely would have confused the
jurors more than it enlightened them."' Indeed, the Oregon
Supreme Court appeared to agree with the dissenters on this
point: after remand, it rejected the proposed instruction as a
matter of state law.' 2 The Court granted certiorari once
again, but later dismissed the writ as improvidently
113
granted.
What could have motivated the Court's opaquely
Solomonic analysis in Philip Morris? A simple pro-business
bias or a blanket antipathy to punitive damages could easily
have yielded an opinion precluding all consideration of harm
to nonparties-and such an opinion would have been more
coherent than the one Justice Breyer produced.
Maybe
Justice Breyer's solution was the appellate equivalent of a
compromise verdict: the best he could do without losing a
majority.
But a more compelling explanation for the
majority's reasoning is that it reflects a distinctive judicial
attitude, one that accepts tort law as a method of remedying
108. See PhilipMorris, 549 U.S. at 353-54.
109. Id. at 355.
110. See id. at 360 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 362-64 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
111. Id. at 363 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
112. Williams v. Philip Morris, Inc., 176 P.3d 1255, 1260-61 (2008), cert.
dismissed, No. 07-1216, 2009 WL 814803 (Mar. 31, 2009) (per curiam).
113. Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Williams, No. 07-1216, 2009 WL 814803
(Mar. 31, 2009) (per curiam).
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the effects of discrete wrongful conduct but is skeptical about
its use as a vehicle for achieving optimal safety regulation
more generally.
On this view, tort damages-punitive
damages included-are constitutionally unobjectionable
insofar as they reflect the blameworthiness of the discrete act
under consideration, but to permit a single jury to assume the
regulator's prerogative of penalizing a corporation for its
overall course of conduct would be standardless and
fundamentally unfair.
The Chamber's brief in Philip Morris provided a helpful
springboard for just such concerns. It began by critiquing the
"practice of using a single-plaintiff lawsuit as a vehicle for
punishing a defendant broadly for uncharged, unadjudicated
conduct.""' The brief drew a parallel between such a lawsuit
and the class action mechanism stripped of the requirement
of typicality."' It argued, with citation to a concurrence by
Justice Kennedy, that juries assessing punitive damages for
harms to nonparties violate separation of powers norms by
acting in a legislative capacity;" 6 raised the specter of
multiple punishments for a single tortious act;" 7 and cited
social science research suggesting that juries face cognitive
limitations on their ability to translate blameworthiness into
dollar amounts in all punitive damages cases, not just ones
involving claims of harm to nonparties." 8
The brief
assembled these concerns about uncharged conduct, multiple
punishment, and erratic juries under the doctrinal rubric of
procedural due process, while making clear the Chamber's
view that the problem of large punitive awards is "not only a
due process problem-it is an economic and social problem of
broad dimension." 1 9 It is not a stretch to suggest that the
concerns articulated in the Chamber's Philip Morris brief
found a voice in the Court's ultimate disposition of the case.

114. Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 2, Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549
U.S. 346 (2007) (No. 05-1256).
115. Id. at 5-8.
116. Id. at 8-9 (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443,
468 (1993) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
117. Id. at 10-14.
118. Id. at 19-21 (citing CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW
JURIES DECIDE 12, 19, 20, 21 (2002)).
119. Id. at 13-14.
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Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker 2 ° presented a different
angle on the punitive damages issue, but the Court's basic
orientation remained the same. Because Exxon was a federal
admiralty case, the Court was able to address the punitive
damages issue in a common-law rather than a constitutional
mode, which meant that Justices Scalia and Thomas could
come on board. Writing for a five-justice majority, Justice
Souter took the opportunity to express broad doubts about
punitive damages, but rather than reject such damages
outright, he insisted on proportionality. 2 ' Citing empirical
studies, the Court concluded that although punitive damage
awards have not been increasing in recent years, they have
become more unpredictable. 1 22 In particular, studies suggest
that juries in cases featuring similar facts arrive at quite
disparate results when it comes to punitive damages. 123 (In
an odd footnote that Pamela Karlan focused on in her
contribution to this symposium, the Court noted a series of
studies that reached a similar conclusion using mock juries,
but then tried to put the toothpaste back in the tube:
"Because this research was funded in part by Exxon, we
decline to rely on it."' 24 ) In light of this unpredictability, the
Court decreed that the ratio of punitive damages to
compensatory damages should not exceed 1:1 in admiralty
cases, or at least in admiralty cases like the Exxon case, by
which the Court seemed to mean cases in which the tortious
conduct was reckless but not intentional or malicious and in
which the compensatory award was large. 2 ' Both Philip
120. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008).
121. Id. at 2619-34. Justice Alito did not participate.
122. Id. at 2624-26.
123. Id. at 2625-26.
124. Id. at 2626 n.17 (citing CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES:
How JURIES DECIDE (2002); David Schkade, Cass R. Sunstein, & Daniel
Kahneman, DeliberatingAbout Dollars: The Severity Shift, 100 COLUM. L. REV.
1139 (2000); Reid Hastie et al., Juror Judgments in Civil Cases: Effects of
Plaintiff'sRequests and Plaintiffs Identity on Punitive DamageAwards, 23 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 445 (1999); and Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive
Damages (with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071
(1998)). See also Pamela Karlan, Kenneth and Harle Montgomery Professor of
Pub. Law, Stanford Law Sch., Panel remarks at the Santa Clara Law Review
Symposium: Big Business and the Roberts Court (Jan. 23, 2009).
125. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2633. The Chamber devoted more than half its
Exxon brief to arguing that punitive damages were preempted by the Clean
Water Act, but the Court had little difficulty in determining that this issue was
raised too late and, in any event, lacked merit. Brief of Amicus Curiae the
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Morris and Exxon reflect a deep suspicion on the part of most
of the justices about the use of punitive damages to control, or
send a message about, the defendant's conduct beyond the
confines of the discrete case being litigated.
C. Arbitration
The party supported by the Chamber has prevailed in
three of the four arbitration cases decided by the Roberts
Court. In Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, the
Court held by a seven-to-one vote that when a contract
contains an arbitration clause, issues concerning the validity
of the contract as a whole must be resolved in the first
instance by the arbitrator, not by a state court. 126 Prior case
law established that questions of validity should be resolved
by a court only when those questions go to the validity of the
arbitration clause in particular; the Court concluded in
Buckeye that this case law applied in state as well as federal
court. 127 In short, the Court held that arbitration clauses are
independently enforceable in state court even if other
provisions in a contract are challenged as invalid.1 2
1 29
In Preston v. Ferrer,
the question was whether an
agreement to arbitrate supersedes state law requiring
disputes over contract validity to be referred initially to an
administrative agency. The Court, by a vote of eight to one,
held that Buckeye was controlling: the Federal Arbitration
Act ("FAA") dictated that the arbitration agreement prevailed
over the contrary state law and, as in Buckeye, the dispute
over the validity of the contract had to be resolved in the first
Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America in Support of Petitioners
at 5-16, Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008) (No. 07-219).
Indeed, not a single justice wrote in support of the preemption argument.
126. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 449 (2006).
Justice Thomas dissented on the ground, stated by him in several earlier cases,
that the Federal Arbitration Act does not apply to state-court proceedings. Id.
(Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Alito did not participate.
127. Id. at 446.
128. The Chamber's brief in Buckeye was almost exclusively doctrinal in
nature, setting forth the precedent-driven arguments that the Court ultimately
embraced in its opinion; the sole policy argument in the brief came at the end
and asserted that litigation over contract validity would hinder Congress's
objective of facilitating arbitration. Brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the
United States of America and the American Financial Services Ass'n as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 13, Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna,
546 U.S. 440 (2006) (No. 04-1264).
129. Preston v. Ferrer, 128 S. Ct. 978 (2008).
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instance by the arbitrator. 130 The Court emphasized the need
to respect Congress's intent to move arbitrable disputes
quickly out of court and into arbitration, where they can be
31
resolved more expeditiously.
In 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett,132 the Court held
enforceable a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") that
required union members to submit claims under the federal
Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") to
arbitration. The biggest obstacle for the employer was the
1974 Gardner-Denver case, which seemed to hold that
employees' rights to a judicial forum under federal
antidiscrimination laws may not be waived through collective
bargaining. 133 Writing for a five-member majority, Justice
Thomas limited that precedent to its facts, reasoning that the
CBA in Gardner-Denver,unlike the one in the instant case,
had not unmistakably encompassed statutory claims. 3 4 At
the same time, though, the majority left little doubt
concerning its views of Gardner-Denver,saying that it "rested
on a misconceived [skeptical] view of arbitration that this
Court has since abandoned,"1 35 "reveal[ed] a distorted
understanding of the compromise made when an employee
agrees to compulsory arbitration,"'1 36 and, if read broadly,
"would appear to be a strong candidate for overruling." 137
The Chamber's sole loss in an arbitration-related case in
the Roberts Court thus far, Vaden v. Discover Bank, 35
130. Id. at 981.
131. Id. at 986 (citing Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,
460 U.S. 1, 22 (1983); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
473 U. S. 614, 633 (1985)). In its brief in Preston, the Chamber argued that a
decision in favor of arbitration was necessary in order to send a message to
California courts to abandon their "hostility" to arbitration. Brief for the
Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petitioner at 16-18, Preston v. Ferrer, 128 S. Ct. 978 (2008) (No. 061463).
132. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009).
133. Id. at *9-*15 (discussing Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36
(1974), and subsequent cases relying on it).
134. Id. at *9-*10.
135. Id. at*12.
136. Id.
137. Id. at *11 n.8. The Chamber's brief in Pyett called for Gardner-Denver
to be distinguished in precisely the fashion, and for precisely the reasons,
eventually adopted by the majority. See generally Brief for the Chamber of
Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioners, 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009) (No. 07-581).
138. Vaden v. Discover Bank, 129 S. Ct. 1262 (2009).
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revolved around a fairly technical question of federal
jurisdiction. The case concerned § 4 of the FAA, which
empowers federal district judges to entertain a petition to
compel arbitration if, in the absence of the arbitration
agreement, the court "would have jurisdiction [over] the
controversy between the parties."13 9 All nine justices agreed
that a federal district court, faced with a § 4 petition, may
"look through" the petition to determine whether the
underlying controversy supports federal jurisdiction. 140 The
five-justice majority, however, concluded that because the
particular dispute at bar was triggered by the filing of a statelaw complaint, the controversy as a whole would not
ordinarily have been subject to federal jurisdiction, and
therefore the petition to arbitrate should not have been

entertained. 141
The arbitration decisions have received relatively little
scholarly and media attention, but they are of great interest
to the business community. Although Pyett revealed fissures
on the Court with respect to the interaction among
arbitration,
collective
bargaining,
and
employment
discrimination, it seems clear that no justice on the current
Court harbors substantial misgivings about the enforceability
of arbitration clauses in standard form contracts or about the
propriety of arbitration as an alternative to traditional
litigation.14
That counts as tremendous progress for the
Chamber.
D. PleadingStandards
Perhaps nowhere do the Roberts Court's doubts about the
139. Id. at 1269 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2006)).
140. Id. at 1273-75; id. at 1279 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). The dissenters in
Vaden formed an unusual lineup: joining Chief Justice Roberts's dissent were
Justices Stevens, Breyer, and Alito.
141. Id. at 1275-79. The Chamber's brief in Vaden focused almost entirely
on policy arguments, emphasizing that the judicial hostility to arbitration that
gave rise to the FAA's enactment continues to exist around the country. See
Brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Respondents at 6-24, Vaden v. Discover Bank, 129 S.Ct.
1262 (2009) (No. 07-773).
142. It should be noted that Justice Thomas has repeatedly made clear his
view, unshared by any other justice, that the Federal Arbitration Act does not
apply to state-court proceedings. See, e.g., Preston v. Ferrer, 128 S.Ct. 978, 989
(2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546
U.S. 440, 449 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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efficacy of litigation come across more clearly than in its
decisions making it easier for business defendants to get
cases dismissed at the pleading stage. The most potentially
4
far-reaching of these is Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly. 1
Twombly was a massive class action brought against the
regional "baby Bell" telephone companies on behalf of "all
subscribers of local telephone and/or high speed internet
services . . . from February 8, 1996 to present."1"
The
complaint alleged that the phone companies had engaged in
"parallel conduct" that implied an antitrust conspiracy. 45
Writing for a seven-justice majority, Justice Souter held that
the complaint failed to state a claim.146 He cited the Court's
own precedents and a leading antitrust treatise for the
proposition that parallel conduct, without more, is
ambiguous: it is "consistent with conspiracy, but just as much
in line with a wide swath of rational and competitive business
strategy unilaterally prompted by common perceptions of the
market." 4 v The Court went further, calling discovery in
antitrust cases unusually time-consuming and expensive, 4 8
and pointedly characterizing the Twombly litigation as
involving
a putative class of at least 90 percent of all subscribers to
local telephone or high-speed Internet service in the
continental United States, in an action against America's
largest telecommunications firms (with many thousands of
employees generating reams and gigabytes of business
records) for unspecified (if any) instances of antitrust
violations that allegedly occurred over a period of seven
years. 4 9
An opinion that stopped there would have sent a strong
message to the antitrust plaintiffs bar-but the Court forged
ahead, going out of its way to jettison one of the most oft-cited

143. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007).
144. Id. at 1962.
145. Id. at 1962-63.
146. Id. at 1974. Justices Stevens and Ginsburg dissented. Id. at 1974-89
(Stevens, J., and Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 1964.
148. Id. at 1966-67 (citing Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v.
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 528 n.17 (1983); Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc.,
368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962); Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101,
1106 (7th Cir. 1984)).
149. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1967 (2007).
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holdings in all of civil procedure: the statement from Conley
v. Gibson that "a complaint should not be dismissed for
failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that
the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim
which would entitle him to relief.' 5° Conley's "no set of facts"
test, wrote Justice Souter, "has been questioned, criticized,
and explained away long enough. [A]fter puzzling the
profession for 50 years, this famous observation has earned
its retirement. " 151
In its place, the Court appeared to
substitute a requirement that the allegations in a complaint,
in order to survive dismissal, must add up to a "plausible"

entitlement to relief.152
It is too early to tell whether lower courts will interpret
Twombly as a mandate to stiffen pleading standards across
the board.' 53 But what is clear is that the Chamber won an
even bigger victory in the case than it had asked for. The
Chamber's brief in Twombly did anticipate the Court's
eventual opinion by describing the case as sprawling,
discovery-intensive, and lawyer-driven,' 5 4 and by emphasizing
that parallel conduct does not imply illegality,'5 5 but nowhere
did it invite the Court to establish a global "plausibility"
threshold for pleadings under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Another defendant-friendly decision came in the Tellabs
case, "' in which the Court reversed the Seventh Circuit and
outlined a relatively strict definition of the PSLRA's
requirement that securities fraud complaints "state with
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the
defendant acted with the required state of mind."5 7 Writing
for an eight-justice majority, Justice Ginsburg noted that one
of Congress's goals in enacting the PSLRA was "to curb

150. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
151. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1969.
152. See, e.g., id. at 1974.
153. Some early indications are to the contrary. See, e.g., Limestone Dev.
Corp. v. Vill. of Lemont, Ill., 520 F.3d 797, 803 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J.)
(cautioning that Twombly should not be read too broadly).
154. Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America et al.
as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 4, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007) (No. 05-1126).
155. Id. at 12-15.
156. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007).
157. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2006).
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frivolous, lawyer-driven litigation,"1 58 and that the statute's
heightened pleading standards were "but one constraint
among many the PSLRA installed to screen out frivolous
suits."159
She concluded that, to produce the necessary
"strong inference," the facts in the complaint must be
considered in their entirety and must give rise to an inference
of scienter that is at least as strong as any competing nonculpable inference. 160 Justices Scalia and Alito would have
gone even further and required plaintiffs to allege facts from
which an inference of scienter was more compelling than any
inference of a non-culpable state of mind.161 Justice Alito also
stated that he would have subjected the allegations in the
complaint to the even more demanding "test that is used at
the summary-judgment and judgment-as-a-matter-of-law
stages."62 Only Justice Stevens would have imposed a less
stringent standard, and even he agreed that "[tihe basic
purpose of the heightened pleading requirement in the
context of securities fraud litigation is to protect defendants
from the costs of discovery and trial in unmeritorious cases,"
and that discovery is intrusive and can invade the privacy of
corporations and their executives.1 63
Like its brief in Dabit, the Chamber's brief in Tellabs
painted a dire panorama of securities litigation as a dystopian
realm in which "plaintiffs wield[] abusive discovery demands
and the threat of massive class action jury awards to coerce
defendants into settling meritless claims," " while litigation
costs cause workers to be laid off, foreign investors to move
their capital elsewhere, and companies to stay mum about
their future prospects lest overly rosy forecasts invite strike
suits. Drawing heavily on judges and scholars such as Frank
Easterbrook, Ralph Winter, John Coffee, and Janet Cooper
Alexander, the Chamber argued that lawsuits brought under
Section 10(b) consume an undue proportion of judicial
158. Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 321.
159. Id. at 323.
160. Id. at 323-24.
161. Id. at 329 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 333 (Alito, J., concurring).
162. Id. at 334 (Alito, J., concurring).
163. Id. at 335 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
164. Brief for the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Ass'n and the
Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioners at 2, Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551
U.S. 308 (2007) (No. 06-484).
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resources and are "an Achilles' heel for our economy."' 65 The
result in Tellabs indicated that the Court was inclined to
share this bleak assessment of securities fraud litigation.
E. Employment Discrimination
One category of cases presents a conspicuous exception to
the Chamber's record of success thus far in the Roberts Court:
cases involving employment law, and those involving
employment discrimination in particular. Out of eight cases
arising under federal workplace antidiscrimination statutes,
1 66
the party supported by the Chamber has won only two.
These cases complicate the picture of the Roberts Court as a
reflexively pro-business or anti-plaintiff Court.
That said, several of the Chamber's losses in the
employment discrimination domain came in technical cases
that turned on statutory interpretation and whose broader
importance seems marginal. One case in this category is
Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp.,167 in which the Court unanimously
held that Title VII's requirement that the defendant have at
least fifteen people on its payroll is not jurisdictional and
therefore cannot be raised for the first time at trial. 168
Arbaugh may reflect the justices' suspicion of litigation
tactics, as its outcome is consistent with concerns raised by
both the plaintiff and the United States that small business
defendants might "sandbag" plaintiffs by waiting until after
trial to raise a jurisdictional numerosity defense.'6 9 Another
case whose significance seems limited is Meacham v. Knolls
165. Id. at 9, 12.
166. The losses were CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1951 (2008);
FederalExpress Corp. v. Holowecki, 128 S. Ct. 1147 (2008); Meacham v. Knolls
Atomic Power Laboratory, 128 S. Ct. 2395 (2008); Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546
U.S. 500 (2006); Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 548
U.S. 53 (2006). The wins were Sprint/UnitedManagement Co. v. Mendelsohn,
128 S. Ct. 1140 (2008), and Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S.
618 (2007). Another victory for the Chamber, 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129
S. Ct. 1456 (2009), is categorized here as an arbitration case; in the interest of
avoiding double counting, I do not list it as an employment discrimination case.
The party supported by the Chamber also prevailed in Domino's Pizza, Inc. v.
McDonald, 546 U.S. 470 (2006), but I have not categorized it as an employment
case, because the plaintiff was an independent contractor.
167. Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006).
168. Id. at 514-16. Justice Alito did not participate.
169. See Brief for Petitioner, Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006) (No.
04-944); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae for Petitioner, Arbaugh,
546 U.S. 500 (No. 04-944).
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Atomic Power Laboratory, v° in which the Court unanimously
held that the exemption under the ADEA for actions taken by
an employer based on reasonable factors other than age
creates an affirmative defense as to which the defendant
bears the burdens of production and persuasion.
A third case in this category is Federal Express Corp. v.
Holowecki,"' which dealt with the necessary ingredients of a
"charge" filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC") under the ADEA.
The plaintiff
contended that any document containing an allegation of
discrimination and the name of the employer was a charge;
the defendant, supported by the Chamber, argued that any
document not acted upon by the EEOC (as in the Federal
Express case itself) could not be a charge.'7 2
The
government's position in the case, which the Court adopted,
was an intermediate one-a charge is any document that can
reasonably be construed as a request for relief.'73 As if to
emphasize the narrowness of the Court's holding, Justice
Kennedy took care at the outset of his opinion to note that the
EEOC's rules and practices under the ADEA differ from those
under Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA"), and that "employees and their counsel must be
careful not to apply rules applicable under one statute to a
different statute without careful and critical examination." 7 4
A final employment discrimination case in this peripheral
category technically counts as a "win" for the Chamber.
Sprint! United Management Co. v. Mendelsohn1 75 raised the
important question of the admissibility of nonparty or "me,
too" evidence in ADEA cases, but the Court chose to punt. In
a unanimous opinion by Justice Thomas, the Court held that
such evidence is neither per se admissible nor per se
170. See Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 128 S. Ct. 2395 (2008).
Justice Breyer did not participate; Justice Thomas dissented in part based on
his view that disparate impact claims are not available under the ADEA. Id. at
2407-08 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
171. Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 128 S. Ct. 1147 (2008).
172. Id. at 1154-55.
173. Id. at 1155.
174. Id. at 1153. In his dissent, joined by Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas
complained that, by defining a charge as "whatever the [EEOC] says it is," the
Court had departed from a sensible understanding of the statutory language
and had failed to provide guidance to complainants, employers, or the agency.
Id. at 1161 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
175. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 128 S. Ct. 1140 (2008).
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inadmissible, leaving resolution of the issue to the discretion
of district court judges-and ultimately, no doubt, to the
decision of a less-than-unanimous Supreme Court in some
future case. 176 In its amicus brief, the Chamber had urged
the Court to adopt a rule of per se inadmissibility, but the
Court's disposition of the case by vacatur and remand
nonetheless registers in the data set as a victory for the
Chamber.
Four more losses for the Chamber came in cases
involving retaliation. In Burlington Northern & Santa Fe
Railway Co. v. White, 77 an employee was reassigned to a
different job within the company, and temporarily suspended,
allegedly in response to filing a sexual harassment complaint.
The Court held that Title VII's prohibition on retaliation is
not limited to employer actions that are themselves related to
employment or occur at the workplace.'
Writing for eight
members of the Court, Justice Breyer began by noting that
the language of the anti-retaliation provision contains no
such limitation, but also concluded that the provision's
purpose was to deter retaliation in all its forms, whether or
not it affects the terms or conditions of employment.'79 The
Court, however, went on to limit the retaliation cause of
action to employer conduct that is "materially adverse," in the
sense that it would deter the reasonable employee
or
80
applicant from pressing a claim of discrimination.
1 an employee
In CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries,""
alleged that he was fired in part because he complained that
another employee was fired because of her race. He failed to
pay timely filing fees on his Title VII claim, so the question
that remained for the Court was whether 42 U.S.C. § 1981, a
civil rights statute enacted just after the Civil War,
encompasses claims for retaliation." 2 The plaintiff relied on
two prior decisions of the Court allowing claims for retaliation
under comparable statutes. The Chamber's brief outlined
176. Id. at 1143.
177. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006).
178. Id. at 64.
179. Id. at 62-64.
Justice Alito would have insisted that actionable
retaliation be related to the terms or conditions of employment. See id. at 79
(Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
180. Id. at 68.
181. CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1951 (2008).
182. Id.at 1954.
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several rationales for denying recovery: first, the language of
§ 1981 makes no mention of retaliation; second, the first case
upon which the plaintiff relied18 3 was decided in 1969, before
the Court adopted a stricter approach to implied causes of
action; and third, allowing retaliation cases to go forward
under § 1981 could frustrate Title VII's remedial scheme."
Even the more recent case cited by the plaintiff-a five-tofour decision from 2005 finding a right to recover for
retaliation under Title IX' 8 -- could be distinguished on the
ground that protection against retaliation is essential under
Title IX because third parties are often best situated to
vindicate students' rights, whereas employees alleging racial
discrimination are already protected against retaliation by
Title VII, assuming they don't forget to pay their filing fees.
In the end only two justices-Thomas and Scalia-were
swayed by these arguments.8 6 The other seven justices
signed on to an opinion in the employee's favor by Justice
Breyer that largely rested on stare decisis. 1 7 Probably in
order to retain seven votes, Justice Breyer's opinion for the
Court in Humphries says virtually nothing about whether
protection against retaliation is generally called for as a
prophylactic measure to fully effectuate broadly worded antidiscrimination statutes.
Most recently, in Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville
and Davidson Cty.,18 the Court held that Title VII's
prohibition on retaliation protects employees who complain
about workplace discrimination in response to questions
during an employer-initiated investigation, and not just those
who complain on their own initiative. The Court's unanimous
ruling reflected a commonsense understanding of the statute
that had been adopted by the EEOC and several Courts of
Appeals; indeed, the Court appears to have granted certiorari
largely in order to reverse the contrary interpretation reached

183. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969).

184. Brief Amicus Curiae for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States
of America in Support of Petitioner at 5-25, CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries,
128 S. Ct. 1951 (2008) (No. 06-1431).
185. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167 (2005).

186. See CBOCS West, Inc., 128 S. Ct. at 1961-70 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
187. See id. at 1955-61.
188. Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville and Davidson Cty., 129 S. Ct. 846
(2009).
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by the Sixth Circuit." 9
The most prominent employment discrimination case of
the Roberts Court era thus far resulted in a win for the
Chamber, though even here the practical fruits of its victory
were short-lived. The question at issue in Ledbetter v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.' 90 appears rather technical at
first glance: whether an EEOC charge in a Title VII lawsuit
alleging pay discrimination on the basis of sex must be filed
within 180 days of the initial act of alleged discrimination.
Much of the argumentation in Ledbetter revolved around the
interpretation of the Court's precedents in related areas of
employment law. Justice Alito's opinion for a five-member
majority leaned heavily on stare decisis, right from its
opening sentence: "This case calls upon us to apply
established precedent in a slightly different context."' 9' The
Court held that the plaintiff was seeking a remedy for the
continuing effects of a discrete, time-barred act of
discrimination rather than for any current actionable
violation, and that precedent foreclosed claims based on later
consequences of earlier, uncharged discriminatory acts.' 92 In
her unusually strongly worded dissent, Justice Ginsburg took
issue not only with the Court's analysis of precedent, but
more fundamentally with its formalistic approach.
She
emphasized instead the practical realities of the situation:
that pay discrimination often takes a long time to detect and
that each disparate paycheck causes tangible harm.' 9 "Once
again," Justice Ginsburg concluded, "the ball is in Congress'
court"' 9 4 -and Congress recently returned her serve by
enacting a statute to overturn the result in Ledbetter in
future cases.' 9'
189. See, e.g., id. at 850, 851.
190. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007).
191. Id. at 620.
192. Id. at 620-28 (discussing Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536
U.S. 101 (2002); Lorance v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989); Delaware
State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980); United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431
U.S. 553 (1977)). See also id. at 633-35 (distinguishing Bazemore v. Friday, 478
U.S. 385 (1986)).
193. Id. at 648-50 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
194. Id. at 662 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
195. Brian Montopoli, Obama Signs Equal Pay Bill, CBS NEWS POLITICAL
HOTSHEET, Jan. 29, 2009, http://www.cbsnews.comblogs/2009/01/29/politics/poli
ticalhotsheet/entry4762222.shtml (noting passage of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair
Pay Restoration Act).
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The Court's opinion in Ledbetter was remarkably similar
in its reasoning, and even its structure, to the Chamber's
amicus brief in the case. To be sure, the Chamber's brief was
more tendentious in its statement of the facts than Justice
Alito's opinion for the Court: it suggested that the plaintiff
deliberately waited until she retired to file a charge, by which
time some of the employer's records had been destroyed and a
manager she had accused of discrimination had died; it
repeatedly pointed out that the manager in question died "of
cancer"; and it described the typical plaintiffs testimony in a
pay discrimination case as "often tear-stained." 9 ' Aside from
these over-the-top moments, though, the brief-like the
Court's opinion-was a very conventional precedent-based
example of legal argumentation.
What are we to make of the Chamber's comparative
failure in employment discrimination cases before the Roberts
Court? Three conclusions suggest themselves. First, the bynow-familiar caveat concerning small sample size, as well as
the predominance of cases raising technical or marginal
issues, caution against reading too much into the Chamber's
track record in this category just yet. Second, it is worth
repeating that the Court sided with the Office of the Solicitor
General in all eight of the employment cases in the data set.
Had the government taken a different stance in these casesparticularly in a case like Federal Express, in which a federal
agency administers the relevant statute-the results might
well have been different.
Third, and most intriguing, the Court's decisions in this
area may suggest that employment discrimination lawsuits
do not raise the same concerns about regulation by litigation
that arise in other areas.
Perhaps employment
discrimination cases do not typically strike the justices as
covert attempts at regulation by other means. Because these
cases usually involve individual plaintiffs who have suffered
discrete and tangible harm, they may not appear to be
lawyer-driven in the way that, say, securities class actions or
contingency fee tort cases seeking large amounts of punitive
damages often do. Moreover, the nature of the harm196. Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America and
the National Federation of Independent Business Legal Foundation as Amici
Curiae in Support of Respondent at 4-5, 17, Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007) (No. 05-1074).
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intentional denial of equal treatment-may resonate
especially well with the justices' basic conceptions of fair play.
This vision of employment discrimination cases would help
explain why a majority of the Court viewed the injury in
Ledbetter as flowing from a discrete wrongful act rather than
a structural disparity in pay based on sex. And even a justice
who is generally suspicious of litigation, for example, may
bridle at the notion of an employer retaliating against an
employee for initiating litigation, as was alleged in
Burlington Northern and Humphries. Some cases may break
this mold--disparate impact claims, like the upcoming case of
Ricci v. DeStefano,'1 97 could be one example-but the pattern
of cases thus far indicates that the Roberts Court does not
view employment discrimination suits with quite the same
skepticism it brings to other forms of litigation, and that this
may help account for the Chamber's less-than-stellar track
record in this area.
III. CONCLUSION
This article suggests that the Roberts Court's decisions in
cases involving the Chamber of Commerce of the United
States can best be explained not by a generalized probusiness (or even pro-defendant) orientation but by a broadly
shared skepticism among the justices about litigation as a
mode of regulation. The concept of "regulation through
litigation" is not a new one; the coinage has been traced to a
1999 online commentary by Robert Reich, 198 and an edited
volume carrying that title appeared in 2002.99 Critics have
used the concept to raise concerns about the use of tort law by
government plaintiffs, °° the use of litigation by state
197. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 894 (2009) (granting certiorari).
198. Victor E. Schwartz & Leah. Lorber, State Farm v. Avery: State Court
Regulation Through LitigationHas Gone Too Far,33 CONN. L. REV. 1215, 1237
(2001) (crediting Reich with coining the term "regulation through litigation").
199. REGULATION THROUGH LITIGATION (W. Kip Viscusi ed.) (2002). See also
ANDREW P. MORRIss, BRUCE YANDLE & ANDREW DORCHAK, REGULATION BY
LITIGATION (2008).

200. See Randall Lutter & Elizabeth Mader, Litigating Lead-Based Paint
Hazards, in REGULATION THROUGH LITIGATION, supra note 199, at 106-36; see

also Edward T. Schroeder, Note, A Tort By Any Other Name? In Search of the
Distinction Between Regulation Through Litigation and Conventional Tort Law,
83 TEX. L. REv. 897, 931 (2005) (defining regulation through litigation as tort
litigation brought by a government plaintiff involving a mass subrogation
claim).
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attorneys general,2 ' and the use of large class actions to
achieve broad regulatory goals.20 2
More empirical work
remains to be done, however, to substantiate this article's
hypothesis that such concerns play a key role in determining
outcomes at the Supreme Court merits stage.20 3
Another area at the intersection of the Supreme Court
and business law that deserves further attention is the
concept of issue salience. While there is no easy way to
measure the salience of the issues that come before the
justices, 20 4 it is reasonable to assume that business cases
generally involve low-salience issues from the justices'
perspective. While the Roberts Court may be a businessfriendly Court, it does not seem exceptionally interested in
business or business-law issues as such. To be sure, the
Court has granted certiorari in more cases that are of interest
to the business community in the last few Terms than in
previous years, and a few justices may have a strong interest
in some business-related matters. 25 But most of the justices
are former academics or public-sector employees, and all
served as judges before becoming justices. For them, as for
the general public, the most salient issues are likely to be
constitutional issues: abortion rights, free speech, affirmative
action, and the like. Business cases have a lower profile in
the media and tend to turn on statutory or regulatory rather
than constitutional issues. One study based on interviews

201. See Donald G. Gifford, Impersonating The Legislature: State Attorneys
General and Parens Patriae ProductLitigation, 49 B.C. L. REV. 913 (2008).
202. See Schwartz & Lorber, supra note 198; Linda A. Willett, Litigation as
an Alternative to Regulation: Problems Created by Follow-On Lawsuits with
Multiple Outcomes, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1477 (2005); but see David

Rosenberg, The Regulatory Advantage of Class Action, in REGULATION
THROUGH LITIGATION, supra note 199, at 244-304.

203. Andrew Siegel has argued at length that hostility to litigation explains
many of the Rehnquist Court's decisions. See Andrew M. Siegel, The Court
Against the Courts: Hostility to Litigation as an Organizing Theme in the
Rehnquist Court's Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1097 (2006). My thesis, in
addition to focusing on the Roberts Court rather than the Rehnquist Court, is
narrower than Siegel's: rather than arguing that the Court is motivated by a
blanket hostility to litigation, I suggest that the Court is skeptical of litigation
when it appears to be used as a substitute for regulation.
204. For one attempt, see Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Measuring Issue
Salience, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 66, 72-77 (2000).
205. Justice Breyer, for example, has a longstanding interest in regulatory
affairs, and Chief Justice Roberts's near-decade in private practice no doubt
attuned him to the interests of the corporate bar.
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with former Supreme Court law clerks concluded that

"amicus briefs were most helpful in cases involving highly
technical and specialized areas of law," 6 and that clerks
believed amicus briefs were least influential in "hot-button"
cases." 7 If business cases are low in salience compared to
most constitutional cases, then this might be an area in which
the legal arguments presented in amicus briefs like the
Chamber's are relatively influential and the justices' broad
ideological commitments are relatively less dispositive.
Finally, if this article is correct that the Roberts Court is
motivated in business cases by a skepticism about regulation
via litigation, it has implications for the ongoing debate
between those scholars, typically legal academics, who
explain judicial decisions largely in terms of legal doctrine
and those, typically political scientists, who explain judicial
decisions largely in terms of ideological preferences. °5 What
this article suggests is that neither of these global
explanations-neither doctrinalism nor attitudinalism-fully
captures how the justices decide cases. Instead, the truth is
somewhere in between. The Roberts Court's business cases
indicate that the justices' decisions are driven most of all by a
set of factors that are neither rigidly doctrinal nor merely
attitudinal. It would be unrealistic to believe that the justices
approach every case with a totally open mind: their votes can
usually be predicted in advance based on a set of inputs that
are less fine-grained than the particular arguments made by
parties or their amici. Individual justices, in other words,
have attitudes. But what this article's examination of the
Chamber of Commerce's cases in the Roberts Court suggests
is that scholars seeking to understand the Court should be
focusing not on attitudes in the crudest political sense, but
instead on attitudes about the law.

206. Lynch, supra note 35, at 41.
207. Id. at 42.
208. For the attitudinal model, see JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH,
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002). For the

doctrinal model, see just about any student-edited law journal. The professional
tendencies described in the text are only tendencies, not iron laws. Increasing
numbers of legal academics have embraced aspects of the political scientists'
model, and some political scientists emphasize other factors in additional to
ideological preferences.
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APPENDIX
Table 1. Outcomes and Voting Patterns in Roberts Court Cases in
which the Chamber of Commerce Participated
Case
14 Penn Plaza LLC
v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct.
1456 (2009)
Entergy Corp. v.
Riverkeeper, Inc.,
129 S. Ct. 1498
(2009)
Vaden v. Discover
Bank, 129 S. Ct.
1262 (2009)
Wyeth v. Levine,
129 S.Ct. 1187
(2009)
Crawford v. Metro.
Gov't, 129 S. Ct.
846 (2009)
Altria Group, Inc. v.
Good, 129 S. Ct.
539 (2008)
Exxon Shipping Co.
v. Baker, 128 S.
Ct. 2605 (2008)
Chamber of
Commerce of the
U.S. v. Brown,
128 S. Ct. 2408

Subject matter
Collective
bargaining;
arbitration
Clean Water Act;
EPA
regulations

Chamber Votes Votes
For Against
Result
4
5
Win
Win

5

4

Federal
Arbitration Act

Loss

4

5

FDA; preemption

Loss

3

6

Title VII;
retaliation

Loss

0

9

Labeling act;
preemption

Loss

4

5

Punitive damages

Win

5

3

National Labor
Relations Act;
preemption

Win

7

2

ADEA

Loss

1

7

(2008)
Meacham v. Knolls
Atomic Power
Lab., 128 S. Ct.
2395 (2008)
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Table 1. Outcomes and Voting Patterns in Roberts Court Cases in
Which the Chamber of Commerce Participated (continued)
Case
Metro. Life Ins. Co.
v. Glenn, 128 S.
Ct. 2343 (2008)
Allison Engine Co.
v. United States
ex rel. Sanders,
128 S.Ct. 2123
(2008)
Bridge v. Phoenix
Bond & Indem.
Co., 128 S. Ct.
2131 (2008)
LaRue v. DeWolff,
Boberg & Assocs.,
128 S. Ct. 1020
(2008)
CBOCS West, Inc.
v. Humphries,
128 S.Ct. 1951
(2008)
Fed. Express Corp.
v. Holowecki, 128
S. Ct. 1147 (2008)
Sprint/United
Mgmt. Co. v.
Mendelsohn, 128
S. Ct. 1140 (2008)
Preston v. Ferrer,
128 S. Ct. 978
(2008)
Riegel v. Medtronic,
Inc., 128 S. Ct.
999 (2008)
Rowe v. N.H. Motor
Transp. Ass'n,
128 S. Ct. 989
(2008)

Subject matter
ERISA

Chamber Votes Votes
Result
For Against
Loss
2
7

False Claims Act

Win

9

0

RICO; mail fraud

Loss

0

9

ERISA

Loss

0

9

Section 1981;
retaliation

Loss

2

7

ADEA;
exhaustion of
administrative
remedies
Employment
discrimination

Loss

2

7

Win

9

0

Federal
Arbitration Act

Win

8

1

FDA preemption

Win

8

1

Federal Aviation
Administration
Authorization
Act; preemption

Win

9

0
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Table 1. Outcomes and Voting Patterns in Roberts Court Cases in
Which the Chamber of Commerce Participated (continued)
Case
Stoneridge Inv.
Partners, LLC v.
Scientific-Atlanta,
Inc., 128 S. Ct.
761 (2008)
FEC v. Wis. Right
to Life, Inc., 551
U.S. 449 (2007)
Tellabs, Inc. v.
Makor Issues &
Rights, Ltd., 551
U.S. 308 (2007)
Credit Suisse Sec.
(USA) LLC v.
Billing, 551 U.S.
264 (2007)
United States v.
Atlantic Research
Corp., 551 U.S.
128 (2007)
Beck v. Pace Int'l
Union, 551 U.S.
96 (2007)
Safeco Ins. Co. v.
Burr, 551 U.S. 47
(2007)
Ledbetter v.
Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 550
U.S. 618 (2007)
Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544 (2007)
Watters v.
Wachovia Bank,
N.A., 550 U.S. 1
(2007)

Subject matter
Securities law;
implied rights
of action

Chamber Votes Votes
For Against
Result
Win
5
3

First
Amendment;
campaign
finance
PSLRA; pleading

Win

5

4

Win

8

1

Securities law

Win

7

1

CERCLA

Win

9

0

ERISA

Win

9

0

Fair Credit
Reporting Act

Win

9

0

Title VII; filing
requirements

Win

5

4

Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure;
pleading
National Bank
Act; preemption

Win

7

2

Win

5

3
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Table 1. Outcomes and Voting Patterns in Roberts Court Cases in
Which the Chamber of Commerce Participated (continued)
Case
Rockwell Int'l Corp.
v. United States,
549 U.S. 457
(2007)
Philip Morris USA
v. Williams, 549
U.S. 346 (2007)
Weyerhaeuser Co.
v. Ross-Simmons
Hardwood
Lumber Co., 549
U.S. 312 (2007)
Burlington N. &
Santa Fe Ry. Co.
v. White, 548 U.S.
53 (2006)
Rapanos v. United
States, 547 U.S.
715 (2006)
Kircher v. Putnam
Funds Trust, 547
U.S. 633 (2006)
Anza v. Ideal Steel
Supply Corp., 547
U.S. 451 (2006)
DaimlerChrysler
Corp. v. Cuno,
547 U.S. 332
(2006)
Sereboffv. Mid
Atlantic Med.
Servs., Inc., 547
U.S. 356 (2006)
Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner &
Smith Inc. v.
Dabit, 547 U.S.
71 (2006)

Subject matter
False Claims Act;
qui tam

Chamber Votes Votes
For Against
Result
2
Win
6

Punitive damages

Win

5

4

Antitrust

Win

9

0

Title VII;
retaliation

Loss

0

9

Clean Water Act;
Commerce
Clause
Securities law;
preemption;
removal
Civil RICO;
fraud; reliance

Win

5

4

Loss

0

9

Win

8

1

Dormant
Commerce
Clause; state
taxation
ERISA

Win

9

0

Win

9

0

Securities law;
preemption

Win

8

0
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Table 1. Outcomes and Voting Patterns in Roberts Court Cases in
Which the Chamber of Commerce Participated (continued)
Case
Texaco Inc. v.
Dagher, 547 U.S.
1 (2006)
Arbaugh v. Y&H
Corp., 546 U.S.
500 (2006)
Domino's Pizza, Inc.
v. McDonald, 546
U.S. 470 (2006)
Buckeye Check
Cashing, Inc. v.
Cardegna, 546
U.S. 440 (2006)
Total Votes

Subject matter
Antitrust

Chamber Votes Votes
Result
For Against
Win
8
0

Title VII; federal
jurisdiction

Loss

0

8

Section 1981;
standing

Win

8

0

Federal
Arbitration Act

Win

7

1

234

142

